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1A Privacy-Preserving Pay-by-Phone Parking System
Ricard Garra, Santi Martı´nez, and Francesc Sebe´
Abstract—Most cities around the world require drivers to pay
for the time they occupy a parking spot. In this way, drivers
are encouraged to shorten parking time so that other drivers are
given a reasonable chance of finding parking. The traditional
way, based on moving to a pay station and placing the issued
parking ticket on the dashboard of the car, presents several
drawbacks like having to predict in advance the duration of
parking or the need to move to the car in case the parking time
has to be extended. Over the last few years, several applications
permitting to pay through the mobile phone have appeared.
Such applications manage detailed information about parking
operations so that accurate profiles of parking habits of car
owners can be created. In this paper we propose a system to
pay for parking by phone which preserves the privacy of drivers
in the sense that the information managed by the system is proven
not to help an attacker with full access to it to do better that she
would do by patrolling the city for collecting information about
parked cars.
Index Terms—Cryptography, Pay-by-phone parking, Privacy.
I. INTRODUCTION
THE amount of vehicles in cities is growing every daywhile it is hardly impossible to increase the amount
of on-street parking bays. Restricting the maximum time a
vehicle can occupy a parking spot is required to encourage a
regular turnover of parking bays and give drivers a reasonable
chance of finding parking. An accurate monitoring can only
be carried out by installing in-ground sensors that send a
notification to a parking officer when a car exceeds the
parking time limit. In-ground sensors have been installed in
several cities like Melbourne, Westminster or San Francisco.
These systems are expensive to install and maintain. In San
Francisco, maintenance of a single parking space is beyond
$20 per month [5].
A cheaper solution is implemented by requiring drivers to
pay for the time they occupy a parking bay. After parking
her car, a driver moves to the closest pay station and makes a
payment. Some parking machines provide credit card facilities
as an additional option to coins. After that, the machine issues
a parking ticket that has to be placed on the dashboard of
the car. Parking enforcement officers patrol parking zones
and monitor for violations which will be punished. Time
restrictions are included by limiting the parking duration in
a parking ticket. This way of limiting parking time is not
accurate since a ticket which is about to expire can simply
be replaced with a new one. Nevertheless, paying for parking
time encourages most drivers to move their cars as soon as
possible.
These systems present several drawbacks:
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• Drivers must ensure to have sufficient coins prior to
parking (if credit cards are not supported).
• Drivers have to predict (and pay for) the duration of
parking in advance. If parking takes less time than
predicted, the money corresponding to unused time is
lost. If parking time has to be extended, the driver is
required to move to the car.
• Moving to the pay station and coming back to the car to
place the parking ticket takes time.
Many towns and cities provide the possibility to pay for
parking by phone [8], [12]–[16], [19], [21]. A driver installs
an app in her mobile phone and creates an account in which
she indicates a source for funding such as a credit card
number. Upon parking, the driver logs in her account, indicates
her car license plate number, the area of the city she has
parked in, and the expected duration. After that, a payment
for the corresponding amount is performed. Some of these
applications permit to interrupt a parking session so that the
money corresponding to unused time is refunded. Also, a
driver can extend parking time without the need to move to
her car.
Parking officers are provided with a mobile device where
they can type a car license plate number and check whether a
payment for that car is in effect. In such a system, a system
server that collects information of all the parking operations
is required so that parking officers can query it. Data provided
to pay-for-parking applications give rise to privacy concerns
since all the parking operations performed by the same car
can be linked through the car license plate number. Hence, the
information collected by these applications permits to infer the
parking habits of car owners.
A. Privacy in car technology
The European Union directive 2010/40/EU (7 July 2010)
defines Intelligent Transportation Systems (ITS) as advanced
applications which, without embodying intelligence as such,
aim to provide innovative services relating to different modes
of transport and traffic management and enable various users
to be better informed and make safer, more coordinated, and
‘smarter’ use of transport networks.
The inclusion of intelligent devices and radio interfaces
on vehicles opens the door to automatic data collection for
tracking and monitoring of drivers’ behaviour. Security and
privacy has been widely addressed in the design of vehicular
technology solutions by making use of advanced cryptography.
Privacy-preserving solutions have been proposed for Vehic-
ular Ad-Hoc Networks (VANETs). In [7] the authors present
a privacy-preserving system for vehicle-generated announce-
ments based on the use of threshold digital signatures which
is secure against external and internal attackers. The pro-
posal [18] employs identity-based group signatures to divide
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tablish liability while preserving privacy. In [6] anonymous
credentials are used to protect the privacy of the drivers in a
navigation scheme that utilizes the on-line road information
collected by a vehicular ad hoc network to guide the drivers
to desired destinations in a real-time manner. The authors
in [10] propose an authentication framework which makes use
of pseudonyms for privacy preservation in which legitimate
third parties achieve non-repudiation of vehicles in certain
situations like investigations for accidents or liabilities.
Privacy is also an issue in parking space management
systems. The system described in [23] gathers information
from sensors in parking spaces which is transmitted to drivers’
mobile devices so that empty spots are viewed and can be
reserved. The application considers privacy by encrypting
the wireless communications. Nevertheless, since a parking
reservation includes the Electronic License Plate (ELP), sys-
tem servers are aware of the exact time a car checks in
and leaves the parking lot. A similar proposal is presented
in [11]. Bilinear pairing cryptography is employed for securing
wireless communications. Transactions are performed by an
on-board unit (OBU) which is assigned a pseudo-identifier
employed to authenticate itself against parking lot road side
units (RSU). Since the same pseudo-identifier is employed in
all the transactions, profiles can be created.
Transportation systems in which vehicles collect data for
services are vulnerable to fake data injection attacks. These
attacks are partially avoided by preventing vehicles from send-
ing data about places where they have not been. The authors
in [24] present a system in which vehicles construct location
proofs from the information received from roadside units. The
system provides privacy by not including information about
user’s identifiers in location proofs.
B. Contribution and plan of this paper
In this paper we present a privacy-preserving pay-by-phone
parking system. Privacy is provided by implementing an
anonymous e-coin based payment system in which payments
are performed for short time intervals. A spent e-coin remains
anonymous unless a parking officer located close to a vehicle
checks its parking status. In such a case, the spent e-coin can
be linked to the car to prove that its driver has actually paid
for parking her car. As a result of this query, the available
information allows to determine that a payment for the present
time has been performed, but it does not permit to get the
start and end times of the parking operation. The system
also permits a driver who has been fined unfairly to provide
cryptographic evidences that a payment had really been made.
Last but not least, our system does not require the driver
to predict the duration of a parking operation in advance.
The driver simply indicates the start and the end times upon
parking and removing her car, respectively.
Section I introduces the paper by providing an overview
about regulated parking zones together with a review of
some papers that describe solutions providing privacy in
car technology. After that, Section II surveys current pay-
by-phone parking systems. Next, Section III describes the
cryptographic tools used by our proposal while Section IV
introduces the system and adversary models together with the
privacy requirements to be provided by a privacy-preserving
pay-by-phone parking system. The novel proposal is detailed
in Section V. Its privacy and security properties are analyzed
in Section VI. Section VII shows the performance of an An-
droid implementation run over different mobile phones while
Section VIII discusses some implementation and deployment
challenges. Finally, Section IX concludes the paper.
II. RELATED WORK
Nowadays there exist several pay-by-phone parking systems
in use. Depending on the method used to specify the duration
of a parking period, they may be classified as start-stop or
start-duration systems.
Table I summarizes some of these systems currently in use,
the platforms for which they are available, and the method
they provide for specifying the duration of a parking period.
TABLE I
PAY-BY-PHONE PARKING SYSTEMS
Parking system Platforms Parking period
And. iOS Win. BB web
EYSAMobile X X X X start-duration
Pango X X X X start-stop
Parkmobile X X X X X start-duration
PayByPhone X X X X start-duration
PayStay X X X start-duration
Telpark X X X start-duration
EYSAMobile [8] is a start-duration service with the ability
to lengthen or shorten the parking time. It warns the driver
when the parking time is about to expire and supports both
PayPal and credit card payments. It is implemented as An-
droid, iPhone, BlackBerry and web apps.
Pango Mobile Parking [12] is a start-stop service. It is able
to help finding parking. In compatible gated lots and garages
the smartphone works as a remote control. Opening the gate to
enter activates payment while opening the gate to exit ends the
parking session. It is provided as Android, iPhone, Windows
and web apps (also a phone number).
Parkmobile [13] is a start-duration service that warns fifteen
minutes before time expiration. It supports PayPal, credit
card and Parkmobile wallet payments. It is implemented as
Android, iPhone, Windows, BlackBerry and web apps.
PayByPhone [15] is a start-duration service that sends
reminder messages when the parking time is about to expire.
You can extend (but not shorten) a parking session remotely. It
allows to pay in compatible parkings and tolls. It is provided
as Android, iPhone, BlackBerry and web apps (also a phone
number).
PayStay [16] is a start-duration service that warns when
the parking period is about to expire. It is implemented as
Android, iPhone and web apps (also a phone number).
Telpark [21] is a start-duration service that sends a reminder
when the time is about to expire. It permits to extend the
parking session remotely. It is provided as Android, iPhone
and web apps.
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provides privacy. The system is aware of all the parking
operations carried out by drivers so that detailed reports of
parking habits can be generated.
To the best of our knowledge, the proposal described in [17]
is the only pay-by-phone parking system addressing privacy
issues. Like ours, that proposal requires an RFID tag to be
placed on cars and payments are made using anonymous e-
coins. In [17], when a driver parks her car in a regulated
zone, a random identifier shared between the RFID tag and
the mobile phone is generated. That identifier is transmitted
by the mobile phone to the system server together with an
anonymous payment for the required parking time. A parking
officer which checks the status of a parked car will read the
on-board RFID tag so as to get its current identifier. Then he
will query the server to check whether a valid payment linked
to that identifier has been received. Since the parking officer
is close to the car, she can see its license plate number. At
this moment the system server and the parking officer have
enough information to link a car license plate number to the
exact begin and end times of a parking operation. Hence a
parking operation only remains private if the parked car is
not checked by a parking officer. In our proposal, the only
information obtained from a parking status query is a boolean
indicating whether a payment for the current time has been
performed (the start and end times stay unknown). The system
in [17] permits to extend the parking time remotely from the
mobile phone but it does not allow to recover the money
corresponding to non-used parking time in case the parking
operation takes less time than expected. In our solution,
the driver pays exactly for her parking duration. Another
feature offered by our system and not provided by [17] is the
possibility to provide cryptographic evidence that a payment
was performed in case a driver is fined unfairly.
III. PRELIMINARIES
This section describes the cryptographic methods required
by the proposed system.
A. Hash-based message authentication codes
A hash-based message authentication code [3] (HMAC)
is a construction for calculating an authentication code of a
message M given a secret key K. The resulting code will be
denoted HMACK(M). An HMAC is a keyed cryptographic
one-way hash function. It offers the one-way and collusion-
secure properties of hash functions with the additional property
that the HMAC digest of a message M can only be computed
if the secret key K is known.
When a message M is sent together with HMACK(M),
a party who knows the secret key K, upon receiving M ,
can compute the authentication code by itself and check that
the result equals the accompanying code. A proper HMAC
validation provides data integrity in the sense that the mes-
sage can not have been modified during its transmission and
authentication since the accompanying code can only have
been computed by a party who knows the secret key.
For an HMAC to be secure it is required that, given M
and HMACK(M), it is infeasible to find K. Also, given
HMACK(M) and K, it is infeasible to get M . Both the secret
key and the generated authentication code should be at least
128 bits long.
An HMAC is implemented as a procedure involving the
computation of two cryptographic hash digests such as SHA-
1 or SHA-256.
B. RSA digital signatures
RSA [20] is a widely known public key cryptosystem whose
security holds on the assumed intractability of the integer
factorization problem. Our proposal employs it for digital
signature computation. An RSA digital signature scheme is
composed of three procedures: private/public key pair gener-
ation, signature computation and signature validation.
A digitally signed message provides authentication (the
message was created by somebody who knows the secret
key related to the public key under which the signature is
validated), non-repudiation (the signer can not deny having
signed the message) and integrity (the message has not been
altered after being signed).
Throughout the paper, the private and public keys of an
entity E will be denoted KPrivE and KPubE , respectively.
A digital signature on a message M signed under the key pair
of E will be denoted SignE(M).
When an RSA public key has a small public exponent
(usually, 65537), the resulting signatures can be verified fast.
C. RSA blind signatures
A blind signature [4] is a form of digital signature in which
the signer and the message owner are different parties. After
an execution of a blind digital signature protocol, the message
owner obtains a signer’s digital signature on her message while
the signer gets no information about the message she actually
signed. The RSA cryptosystem provides a simple method for
computing blind signatures.
Key generation in RSA is a time-consuming task due to the
need to generate two large prime numbers. Hence, the RSA
cryptosystem is not a good option in systems requiring the
generation of a large amount of public keys. Elliptic curve
cryptography overcomes the mentioned drawback of RSA.
D. Cryptography over elliptic curves
An ElGamal-like public key cryptosystem can be built over
a prime order subgroup of the group of points of an elliptic
curve [9]. Such a cryptosystem requires a setup procedure in
which a proper elliptic curve is chosen. After the setup has
been carried out, a private/public key pair can be generated
very fast. The Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm
(ECDSA) [1] is a standard for computing digital signatures
on an elliptic curve cryptosystem.
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A trusted timestamp [2] is a timestamp issued by a trusted
party acting as a timestamp authority (TSA). A trusted times-
tamp is used to prove the existence of a certain piece of data
before a certain point in time.
A timestamp on a message M is generated by first comput-
ing a hash digest of M , H(M). That digest is transmitted to
the timestamp authority which will concatenate a timestamp
to that hash and then compute the hash of this concatenation.
The obtained digest is digitally signed with the private key of
the TSA. The resulting signature is sent back to the timestamp
requester.
A timestamp on M is checked by verifying that the hash of
the concatenation of H(M) and the timestamp were actually
signed by the TSA.
F. Anonymous communications on the Internet
IP datagrams transmitted through the Internet include the
IP address of the source device. That information is required
for addressing the response datagrams. In this way, datagrams
sent from the same device, although belonging to different
TCP connections, can be linked through the IP source address
field.
Tor [22] is a software for enabling anonymous communi-
cations. Tor directs Internet traffic through a free, worldwide,
volunteer network to conceal a user’s location and usage from
anyone conducting network surveillance or traffic analysis.
The destination server receives the data from a randomly
selected Tor relay so that the real source device remains
unknown to it. Data transmitted in this way is said to be
transmitted through an anonymous channel.
Tor is available for mobile devices. The Orbot package
implements a Tor client for mobile devices running Android.
IV. SYSTEM AND ADVERSARY MODELS
This section first presents the system and adversary models.
After that, the privacy requirements to be satisfied by a
privacy-preserving pay-by-phone parking system are stated.
A. System model
Pay-by-phone parking systems implement a system model
composed of four actor types:
• Mobile application: It is installed and runs in the mobile
device of drivers. Drivers use it to manage the credit in
their accounts (in prepaid systems) and to pay for parking
operations.
• System server: This is an on-line platform accessed by
drivers, via the mobile application, to purchase credit or
to pay for a parking operation. It manages the information
about parking operations. This platform may include
several machines performing different tasks (our proposal
includes a timestamp server).
• Parking officer: He patrols the city carrying a mobile
device through which he queries the system server to
check the parking status of cars.
• Car: Each car has an identifier used by parking officers
to check its parking status. Most pay-by-phone parking
systems use the license plate number as identifier. In [17]
and in our proposal, the identifier is a pseudo-random
binary sequence transmitted via RFID.
Figure 1 depicts the main interactions among these actors.
A mobile application, upon indication of its owner, contacts
the system server to purchase credit or to pay for parking.
In systems providing privacy about drivers’ parking habits,
the communications carried out during a parking operation
payment have to employ an anonymous channel. A parking
officer checks the parking status of a car by first getting its
identifier and then querying the system server to check whether
a valid payment is in effect.
Other interactions are possible. In our proposal the mobile
application can also contact the system server to complain for
an unfairly received fine.
Fig. 1. System model.
B. Adversary model
As a fundamental aspect, we assume the employed cryp-
tography provides computational security in the sense that no
party has enough computing power to perform brute force
attacks against the cryptographic primitives.
Regarding an adversary trying to compromise drivers’ pri-
vacy, the following assumptions are made:
• An adversary cannot corrupt the application running on
the mobile phone nor an eventual on-board device placed
in cars. The mobile app and on-board devices act as
specified by the system protocols and do not leak any
private information about the data they store nor about
the internal computations they perform.
• An adversary has full access to all the information
received and managed by the system server and parking
officers, but it cannot corrupt their behaviour. In this
sense, the system server and parking officers are honest
but curious entities. They do not deviate from the protocol
but can collaborate with an adversary who is trying to get
information about drivers’ parking habits.
Drivers are untrusted entities who might try to get parking
time without paying for it. To that end, several drivers could
collude and/or transmit misgenerated data. In fact, the system
server can not be sure that an entity communicating with it is
running an original app.
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In our opinion, a privacy-preserving pay-by-phone parking
system should provide the following privacy features:
1) A payment performed for parking a vehicle remains
anonymous unless a parking officer located close to the
car checks its payment status or the car owner complains
for an unfairly received fine.
2) The only information obtained by a parking officer with
full access to all the information managed by the system
regarding a parked car is a boolean indicating whether
a payment valid for the present time has been properly
performed.
3) A driver can prove to a third party that she performed
a payment for a period including a given time instant.
In that case, no information about other time instants is
revealed.
The system must allow to determine whether a given car
has paid for parking or not. Requirement 1 states that checking
can only be performed by a parking officer who is close to
the vehicle. In this way, the system does not provide any
help to automatic creation of parking profiles. The information
collected by the system does not help an attacker with full
access to it to do better that she would do by patrolling the
city for collecting information about parked cars. Requiring
a parking officer to be near the vehicle implies that the
parking status of a car can not be checked by just typing the
license plate number in an application. Some kind of dynamic
pseudonym only obtainable when you are close to the vehicle
is required for checking a parking status.
Note that Requirement 2 causes that a parking officer can
not determine when a car was parked neither how long the
parking operation will take.
Requirement 3 is for allowing users to prove a payment
had been performed in case they were fined unfairly. In such
a case, no information about other time instants is leaked.
V. OUR PROPOSAL
A. System overview
In our proposal a driver has to install an app in her mobile
phone and place an on-board device in her car. Both devices
share a secret key.
The app manages an electronic wallet which contains elec-
tronic coins used for paying for parking time. When the wallet
is about to run out of e-coins, the user may contact the system
server and request a bunch of new electronic coins (the app
could be configured to perform this request automatically).
These coins are paid by credit card or using some on-line
payment system such as PayPal.
Upon parking the car in a regulated zone, the driver logs in
her app and indicates the beginning of a parking operation. At
this moment, the app contacts the system server and performs
an e-coin payment operation. Each e-coin payment is for a
short time interval (e.g., 10 minutes). The app regularly con-
tacts the server (when the previous payment is about to expire)
and pays for the next time slot. A time slot is represented as an
integer (for instance, amount of 10 minutes intervals since the
beginning of year 2000). When the system server receives an
e-coin, it requests a time authority to timestamp it and sends
the timestamp back to the app which will store it. When the
driver removes the car from the parking bay, she indicates the
app to stop performing regular payments.
A description of the system components is next provided:
• Mobile application: This is an app installed in the mobile
device of drivers. Its functionalities are:
– Request and pay for a bunch of new e-coins when
the wallet is about to run out of e-coins.
– Start making periodic payments when a parking
operation begins and stop doing them when it con-
cludes.
– Permit the driver to complain about an unfairly
received fine.
All these operations are made against the system server.
E-coin payments are transmitted through an anonymous
channel.
• On-board device: This is a device located in the car
which is readable via RFID by the mobile device carried
by parking officers. Upon a parking officer request, it
responds by transmitting its current time pseudonym. This
device incorporates an internal clock and can communi-
cate via NFC with the driver’s mobile phone for setup.
• Parking officer: A parking officer carries a device with
an RFID reader which can query the on-board device of
a car and ask for its current pseudonym. After getting the
pseudonym the mobile device contacts the system server
to check whether a valid payment has been performed for
the checked car.
• Timestamp server: It timestamps the payments performed
by the mobile app of drivers so that, if necessary, drivers
can prove that a certain payment was made at a given
time. The data to be timestamped is received from the
system server.
• System server: It provides anonymous e-coins to mobile
apps. It also receives e-coin payments from the mobile
apps (through an anonymous channel), requests the times-
tamp server to timestamp them and sends each timestamp
back to the corresponding mobile app. Parking officers
query it for checking the payment status of parked cars.
These queries are made using the current time pseudonym
of cars.
Note that our proposal matches the system model described
in Section IV-A
B. System description
Our system is composed of the following procedures:
• System parameters establishment
• Setup
• E-coins request
• Time slot payment
• Parking status query
• Fine complaint
1) System parameters establishment: This procedure is
carried out when the company providing the pay-for-parking
service starts to operate. That company manages a system
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parameters:
• Generate an RSA private/public key pair,
KPrivServer/KPubServer. The server public key
must be certified by some certificate authority.
• Set an elliptic curve (together with a generator of its large
primer order subgroup and all the required parameters)
suitable for cryptographic uses.
The system includes a timestamp authority which manages
a server that is going to timestamp the spent e-coins. This
authority possesses an RSA private key KPrivTSA and the
corresponding public key KPubTSA with an appropiate digital
certificate. This key pair is employed for issuing timestamps.
2) Setup: This procedure is run when a driver wishes to
start using the system. The driver has to download and install
the application in her mobile device and acquire an on-board
device. On-board devices are manufactured so that each one
comes with a stored secret key KNFC which is communicated
to the driver in a sealed envelope. In a first step, the driver
types the license plate number Lic, the key KNFC , and the
data required for purchasing e-coins (such as a credit card
number) into the mobile application so that they are stored
there.
Next a secret key s, shared between the on-board device
and the mobile app is established. We propose a method
in which the driver chooses to run a “Parameter setting”
option in the mobile application. The application generates
and stores a random secret key s and then composes a
“Parameter setting message” which includes the secret s,
the car license plate number Lic, the current time Time,
and a secure authentication code HMACKNFC (s||Lic||Time)
only computable if you are in possession of KNFC (see
Section III-A). That setting message is then encrypted in AES
under key KNFC and transmitted to the on-board device via
NFC. Upon receiving that message, the device decrypts it and
checks the authentication code. If the verification is successful
it stores the received s and Lic. It also sets its internal clock
to the received Time.
The system should include a method allowing the driver to
modify the KNFC key.
3) E-coins request: When the mobile application is run for
the first time or it is about to run out of e-coins, the user
can contact the system server and ask for a bunch of new e-
coins. Then a payment by credit card or some other payment
method will be performed. The value (and price) of each e-
coin corresponds to the price of parking during a time slot
(e.g., 10 minutes) in a specific zone.
An e-coin is generated as follows:
1) The mobile app, using the elliptic curve set by
the system server during the parameter establishment
phase, randomly generates an elliptic curve secret key
KPrivcoin and its corresponding public key KPubcoin
(see Section III-D).
2) Next, the mobile app and the system server engage in
an RSA blind signature protocol (see Section III-C) so
that, as a result, the mobile app obtains a system server
RSA signature on its elliptic curve public key. An e-coin
is a tuple
{SignServer(KPubcoin),KPubcoin,KPrivcoin}.
3) The app stores the generated e-coin.
The previous e-coin withdrawal protocol is executed as
many times as the amount of requested e-coins.
4) Time slot payment: When the driver parks her car in a
regulated zone, she logs in the mobile app and indicates the
beginning of a parking period. From now on, the application
will spend an e-coin at the beginning of each time slot.
An e-coin is spent as follows:
1) From the current time, the application generates an
integer indicating the current time slot, Slot (amount
of 10 minute intervals since year 2000).
2) The app generates a current time intermediate identi-
fier by computing hSlot = HMACs(Slot). The cur-
rent time identifier is then generated as IDSlot =
HMAChSlot(Slot||Lic).
3) Then, it takes an unspent e-coin,
{SignServer(KPubcoin),KPubcoin,KPrivcoin},
from the phone wallet, and using secret key
KPrivcoin, computes the elliptic curve digital signature
Signcoin(IDSlot).
4) After that, it sends SignServer(KPubcoin), KPubcoin,
IDSlot and Signcoin(IDSlot) to the system server
through an anonymous channel.
5) The system server:
a) Checks that SignServer(KPubcoin) is a valid sig-
nature on KPubcoin verifiable under its RSA pub-
lic key KPubServer.
b) Checks that it has not accepted a previous payment
with an e-coin containing KPubcoin.
c) Checks that Signcoin(IDSlot) is a valid signature
on IDSlot verifiable under the elliptic curve public
key KPubcoin.
6) If all the previous checkings are satisfied, it requests the
TSA to timestamp IDSlot. The received timestamp is
forwarded to the mobile app which receives it through
the anonymous channel and stores it.
7) Finally the system server stores a tuple with
KPubcoin, IDSlot, Signcoin(IDSlot) and
TimeStampTSA(IDSlot) in a database containing
all the spent coins.
This payment process will be automatically repeated every
time interval until the driver indicates the app to stop.
5) Parking status query: Parking officers patrol parking
areas and check that a payment has been performed for the
parked cars.
This is done as follows:
1) The parking officer types the car license plate number,
Lic, into her device. Then she approaches it to the car
and queries its on-board device by performing an RFID
query.
2) Upon receiving that query, the device reads its internal
clock and computes the current time slot, Slot. From
Slot, the secret key s, and the license plate number
Lic, the on-board device computes hSlot and IDSlot as
7described in Step 2 of the time slot payment procedure
(Section V-B4).
3) The on-board device responds to the query by returning
Slot, hSlot and IDSlot.
4) Upon receiving the response, the mobile device:
a) Checks that the received Slot corresponds to the
current time.
b) Checks that the received IDSlot equals
HMAChSlot(Slot||Lic).
c) Queries the system server to verify that an e-coin
linked to IDSlot has been spent. If the response is
negative, the car will be fined.
6) Fine complaint: If a driver is fined during a time slot for
which she had actually made a payment, she can prove that
she had actually paid by means of the following procedure
carried out through the mobile app.
1) Introduce the date and time of the fine so that the app
can compute the time slot, Slot, the fine was made.
2) Compute the intermediate identifier as hSlot =
HMACs(Slot).
3) Send Slot, hSlot, Lic, and the timestamped IDSlot to
the system server.
4) From the received data, the system server computes
IDSlot = HMAChSlot(Slot||Lic) and verifies the
timestamp on IDSlot. If the previous checking is sat-
isfied, the fine is removed.
VI. SECURITY ANALYSIS
In this section, the security of the presented proposal is
analyzed. The attacker model assumed in Section IV-B states
that the on-board device and the mobile app can not be
corrupted by an adversary. In our proposal, this assumption
implies that:
• The on-board device:
– It only transmits hSlot and IDSlot for the current
time slot, Slot, upon reception of a query from
a close enough parking officer RFID reader (its
internal clock can not be manipulated).
– It does not leak any information about the stored
secret key s nor about the internal computations it
performs.
• The application running on the mobile phone:
– It properly runs all the system procedures as de-
scribed in the paper and upon indication of the driver.
– It does not leak any information about the stored data
nor about the internal computations it performs but
that transmitted as specified by the system protocols.
– When required, it can communicate anonymously
with the system server (see Section III-F).
Trust on the on-board device can be achieved by making it
incorporate tamper–resistant storage and computation media,
like a smart card processor. For the mobile app to be trusted,
it must be audited by an external entity to check it properly
implements the system procedures. Also, the data stored by
the app should not be accessible to eventual malware which
has broken into the phone. Security measures incorporated by
nowadays mobile phones like process isolation (sandboxing)
and encrypted filesystems contribute to make this assumption
realistic.
The attacker model also assumes that the system server
(including the timestamp server) and the parking officers are
honest but curious. Next we discuss the feasibility of this
assumption. In our system, the mobile app interaction with
the system and timestamp servers consists on the reception
of signed data (a signed e-coin during an e-coin request
and a timestamped piece of data after a time slot payment)
whose validity is easily checked by the mobile app. Hence,
these servers cannot misoperate without the app immediately
noticing it. Eventual attacks based on interrupting the system
procedures execution, or issuance of unfair parking fines by
the parking officers would cause the drivers to complain to the
city council asking for an alternative service provider. Hence,
assuming that in case of corruption they take a honest but
curious behaviour is realistic.
A. Privacy analysis
We consider an attack against the privacy of a driver is
successful when a malicious coalition composed of the system
server, the timestamp authority, and some parking officers is
able to determine her car was parked at a given time slot
without none of the parking officers being located close to the
car.
The following lemmas and theorem state the previous
privacy breach is not possible under the assumed adversary
model.
Lemma 1: If the intermediate identifier hSlot remains se-
cret, a spent electronic coin can not be linked to a car license
plate number.
Proof. During an e-coin request phase, the mobile de-
vice of a driver withdraws a set of e-coins. Each e-coin
is randomly generated in driver’s device so that the server
gets no information about it at this time. After that, the e-
coin public key KPubcoin is blindly signed by the server.
A blind signature protocol guarantees that the server gets no
information about the signed data (see Section III-C). Hence,
no information about the e-coin is obtained as a result of
an e-coin withdrawal operation. Since e-coins are generated
independently at random, there exists no relation among them.
The mobile device is assumed to leak no information about
the generated coins.
When an e-coin is spent (see Section V-B4), the e-coin
public data is transmitted anonymously to the system server
so that the data received by the server can not be related to
the mobile device which is transmitting it nor to any coin
previously spent by that device. That e-coin is linked to the
current time identifier IDslot via a digital signature (step 3).
Next, we show that IDslot can not be related to the car.
Given IDslot, the server knows the value of Slot and
may be interested in checking whether that identifier
corresponds to a given license plate number Lic. Since
IDslot = HMAChSlot(Slot||Lic), checking for that relation
would require a brute force search for hSlot which is
infeasible (see Section III-A). Another possibility would be to
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but this requires a brute force search for s which is also
unfeasible. Both the on-board and the mobile phone devices
are assumed not to leak any information about the secret key
s nor about hSlot. 
Lemma 2: If the secret key s is kept secret, knowledge of
an intermediate identifier hSlot for a given time slot, Slot,
does not provide any advantage in the computation of hSlot′
for another time slot, Slot′.
Proof. The value hSlot is computed as hSlot =
HMACs(Slot). Since finding s from hSlot and Slot is
unfeasible, the computation hSlot′ = HMACs(Slot′) can not
be carried out unless s is known. The secret key s is only
stored in the on-board device and in the mobile phone device.
Both devices are assumed to keep it secret. 
Theorem 1: The proposed system fulfills the privacy re-
quirements enumerated in Section IV-C.
Proof. Requirement 1 states that a spent e-coin remains
anonymous unless a parking officer checks a parking status
or a fine complaint operation takes place. An e-coin is spent
linked to a time identifier IDSlot. From Lemma 1, we know
that IDslot can not be linked to a car license plate number
unless some additional information is provided. Next, we
explain the two only cases in which such information is made
available.
When a car parking officer checks for the status of a car,
it queries the on-board device and gets hSlot and IDSlot as
response. The parking officer can then determine the car plate
number linked to IDSlot because he is in front of the car
whose on-board device has transmitted IDSlot. Hence, the
parking officer and the system server have enough information
to link a spent coin stored in the system server database to
a car license plate number. Such relation permits to infer
that the car with Lic was parked at a given time. But this
information is already known by the parking officer since he
is located in front of the parked car. The identifier IDSlot is
related to a car only during a given time slot (10 minutes).
Hence, the only information obtained is that the car with
plate number Lic performed a payment valid for a given time
slot, Slot. Lemma 2 states that, as long as s remains secret,
revealing hSlot does not provide information about other time
slots. During the car parking status query, no values hSlot′
nor IDSlot′ for other time slots are revealed by the on-board
device, hence Requirement 2 is fulfilled.
When a driver complains for an unfair fine received during
a time slot, Slot, the mobile application computes hSlot and
sends this value, together with Slot and Lic to the system
server. Then the system server computes IDSlot and checks
that the app sent a proper timestamp for it which proves that
an appropiate payment for IDSlot was performed. In that
case, the system server can search its database for a spent
coin related to IDSlot which can be linked to Lic. Lemma 2
states that, as long as s remains secret, revealing hSlot does
not provide information about other time slots. During a fine
complaint, no value hSlot′ for other time slots is revealed by
the mobile phone, hence Requirement 3 is also fulfilled. 
B. E-coin system security analysis
Theorem 1 proves that the proposed system fulfills its
privacy requirements. Next we comment the fulfillment of
some additional security properties that have to be provided by
any e-coin based payment system: unforgeability and security
against double spending.
Lemma 3: The e-coin system employed by our proposal is
unforgeable.
Proof. An e-coin system is unforgeable if valid e-coins
cannot be created by dishonest entities. In our system, an
e-coin is valid if and only if its public key component
(KPubcoin) has been properly signed by the server. Hence,
an e-coin can only be generated if the server takes part in
the process by (blindly) signing its public key component.
Obviously, the server will only participate in the creation of
e-coins after receiving an appropiate payment. Since an RSA
signature over hashed data is non-malleable, availability of
server signatures on previous e-coins can not be used to forge
new ones. Obviously, the server’s private key is assumed to
be kept secure. 
Lemma 4: The e-coin system employed by our proposal is
secure against double-spending.
Proof. Double-spending is a fraud in which an e-coin is
spent more than one time. In our system, the server stores
the spent e-coins in a database. If a previously spent e-coin
is received again, the server will detect the situation since it
will find that the public key component of the newly received
e-coin is already stored in its database.
In case of dispute, the server can show that an e-
coin was previously spent by showing IDslot, the pub-
lic key KPubcoin, the signature Signcoin(IDSlot), and
TimeStampTSA(IDSlot). The timestamp provides the exact
time the e-coin was spent for the first time. Moreover, the
signature Signcoin(IDSlot) can only have been generated by
the party who created the e-coin since its generation requires
knowledge of the secret key KPrivcoin. In this way, the
possession of Signcoin(IDSlot) by the server indicates that
the party who created that e-coin actively participated in its
spending process.
Since e-coins are generated by the mobile phone app, it
could happen that the apps of two different drivers generate
exactly the same e-coin by randomly choosing the same private
key (step 1 in Section V-B3). Since the private key is a large
randomly chosen integer (at least 224 bits), the first collision
is expected to happen after the generation of at least 2112 e-
coins. Hence, a collision will rarely happen. The low value of
an e-coin (the price of 10 minutes of parking time) permits
to implement a solution in which drivers accept to remove an
e-coin if that e-coin is reported to have been spent previously.
Obviously, if that situation is repeated several times, the driver
will have to complain. 
VII. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
The designed system has been implemented as an An-
droid app. We have then measured the time required for e-
9coin generation and time slot payment. These are the two
procedures that will be run frequently on drivers’ mobile
phone. The performance of the remaining procedures is not so
relevant. For instance, the setup procedure is run just once after
installing the application, while fine complaint will rarely be
required. In any case, their complexities are similar to those of
the measured procedures so that times with similar magnitude
would be obtained.
TABLE II
MOBILE APPLICATION RUNNING TIMES (IN MILLISECONDS).
Mobile phone Request 12 e-coins Pay 12 time slots
Parallel Serial Parallel Serial
HTC EVO 3D 3009 4958 2961 4874
S. Galaxy S III mini 2250 2835 2218 3043
LG Nexus 4 2977 4160 2932 4057
LG Nexus 5 559 1762 470 1428
LG Nexus 5X 326 553 264 539
Huawei Nexus 6P 300 520 218 479
Our implementation employs 2048–bit RSA and 224–bit
elliptic curve keys which, as of 2016, are considered secure.
We have measured the time required to request 12 e-coins
and the time to pay for 12 time slots, both in serial and in
a threaded parallel version of each procedure on a collection
of Android phones with different capabilities. The following
list summarizes their processors and Android versions. The
RAM memory sizes are not included since the app requires
very little memory.
• HTC EVO 3D: Qualcomm MSM8660 Snapdragon S3
(Dual-core 1.2 GHz Scorpion), with Android 4.0.3.
• Samsung Galaxy S III mini: NovaThor U8420 (1.0 GHz
dual-core Cortex-A9), with Android 4.2.2.
• LG Nexus 4: Qualcomm APQ8064 Snapdragon S4 Pro
(Quad-core 1.5 GHz Krait), with Android 5.1.1.
• LG Nexus 5: Qualcomm MSM8974 Snapdragon 800
(Quad-core 2.3 GHz Krait 400), with Android 6.0.1.
• LG Nexus 5X: Qualcomm MSM8992 Snapdragon 808
(Quad-core 1.44 GHz Cortex-A53 & dual-core 1.82 GHz
Cortex-A57), with Android 6.0.1.
• Huawei Nexus 6P: Qualcomm MSM8994 Snapdragon
810 (Quad-core 1.55 GHz Cortex-A53 & Quad-core 2.0
GHz Cortex-A57), with Android 6.0.1.
Table II shows the measured times for requesting 12 e-
coins (serial and parallel) and paying for 12 time slots (also
serial and parallel) for each device. It has to be taken into
account that the Nexus devices used in our experiments
manage an encrypted filesystem which negativelly affects
their performances, specially in the Nexus 4 model. Our
experiments do not include the time due to delay in network
communications since this is an aspect depending exclusively
on the communication network. With the adventure of 4G
networks, network delay will surely become negligible in the
near future.
We have observed that the running time strongly depends on
the device computation power. The slowest speed is obtained
for the HTC EVO 3D mobile phone which was released on
July, 2011. More up-to-date devices, like LG Nexus 5X and
Huawei Nexus 6P, both released in 2015, provide ten times
faster times. In all the cases, the measured computation times
prove that the proposed system is feasible to be implemented
for current mobile devices.
Regarding the complexity at the server side, the system
has been tested on a computer with an Intel i5-4460 3.2
GHz processor. In our experiments, a single core was able to
compute more than 50,000 RSA blind signatures per second,
which is the cryptographic operation performed by the server
when generating an e-coin. Regarding the reception of e-coin
payments, a single core could validate up to 170 e-coins per
second. In a quad-core parallel implementation, we achieved
over 200,000 RSA signature computations and 680 e-coin
validations per second.
VIII. IMPLEMENTATION AND DEPLOYMENT CHALLENGES
The system server should be deployed on a computer
with a reliable Internet connection placed in a secure en-
vironment protecting it against eventual attacks aiming to
disrupt it. Hence, placing it in a data center with intrusion
detection and protection mechanisms is recommended. We
also recommend to contract the services provided by an online
payment provider to deal with the payments received from the
drivers when acquiring e-coins. The timestamp server could
be deployed on the same computer but it would be better to
place it on a separate machine accessible only from the system
server.
Regarding the mobile app (run by drivers), it must be run
on a mobile phone with an Internet connection. The system
makes use of direct client-server communications against the
server during the e-coin request and fine complaint procedures,
and a client-server anonymous communication during time
slot payment procedure. Software implementing anonymous
communications for mobile phones is currently available. The
mobile device should be NFC enabled, which is a common
feature in nowadays mobile phones, for communicating with
the on-board device during setup.
Parking officers carry a mobile device with an Internet
connection and an HF RFID reader capable of querying the
on-board device. Such devices are already available.
The most challenging part is the on-board device to
be placed in cars. That device should be composed of a
smartcard–type tamper–resistant processor able to compute
HMAC digests and AES decryption operations. It also carries
an internal clock which requires the device to be fed through
its own batteries. Regarding communications, the device has
to be able to act as a receiver for NFC communications (run
during the setup procedure) and respond to RFID queries
coming from parking officers.
As for the cryptographic operations, there already exist
smartcard processors implementing the required operations.
Some of them support 128-bit AES encryption/decryption and
SHA-1 among others. NFC operates at the 13.56 MHz fre-
quency, also used by High-Frequency (HF) RFID tags. Hence,
an HF RFID enabled device can communicate both with NFC
and HF RFID readers. In this way, the on-board device only
needs to carry an HF RFID antenna. The need of an internal
clock requires that device to include a battery. We conclude
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that the on-board device could be easily manufacturable with
current technology.
IX. CONCLUSION
A privacy-preserving pay-by-phone parking system has been
presented. From the driver’s point of view, the system is
composed of two components: an RFID and NFC enabled
on-board device which is placed in the car, and an app which
is installed in the mobile phone.
The app manages an electronic wallet which is loaded with
e-coins. When the driver parks her car in a regulated area, the
mobile app starts making periodic e-coin payments for short
time intervals until the car is removed from the parking spot.
The system has been proven to provide privacy by not
allowing the creation of profiles about drivers’ parking habits.
The system is also secure against e-coin forgery and double-
spending and permits a driver who has been fined unfairly to
prove, by providing cryptographic evidences, that a payment
had really been made.
In the future we plan to investigate the design of the
app focusing on its usability. Together with the design of
the graphical interface, we will also investigate solutions
permitting to use the application even when the driver expects
to be out of coverage during part of the time her car is parked.
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